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ABSTRACT      Microfinance institutions have successfully extended unsecured small loans to 
poor and opaque borrowers at the bottom of the economic pyramid. This success is largely 
due to innovative financial contracts that impose joint liability and create dynamic incentives 
to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information. Given recent advances in microfinance 
contracts, there is a need to map the theoretical developments. This paper aims to accomplish 
that, by performing a critical literature survey of microlending contracts, focusing on joint 
liability and dynamic incentives, bringing out some of the deficiencies of contract-theoretic 
propositions that cannot effectively account for the social mission of microfinance. 
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I. Introduction 
Modern institutional microfinance emerged in the 1970s when socially oriented microfinance 
institutions (henceforth MFIs) in South Asia and Latin America started financing business 
endeavours of the poor without securing loans with adequate collateral. The interest of 
academic scholars, development practitioners and commercial investors in the field has since 
then grown exponentially. The United Nations declared 2005 as the international year of 
microcredit. In 2006, the Nobel peace prize was awarded to the Grameen Bank and its 
founder, Muhammad Yunus, one of the modern microfinance pioneers. Presently, millions of 
individuals benefit from more than 10,000 MFIs globally (Bellman, 2006), that include 
government agencies, non-government organisations, credit unions, cooperatives, private and 
commercial banks and variations of these forms. 
MFIs aim at channelling capital from both profit-seeking investors and socially driven 
donors to the poor that are unable to obtain funds through more conventional channels as a 
result of collateral requirements and high operational costs for lenders. Collateral, normally 
used to mitigate agency problems, is even more important for non-standard clientele with 
little credit history and unknown skill set. High costs are a product of the small size of the 
loans, and are exacerbated by the inadequacy of conventional financial appraisal tools for 
poor borrowers.   
The dialectic is currently centred around the above issues, their effect on all 
stakeholders and the viability of the sector. With regard to the costs, successful MFIs have 
demonstrated that the poor can be creditworthy and that microenterprises can generate enough 
cash flows to meet microloan obligations, while their decision to borrow appears to be fairly 
inelastic to microloan interest rates. Karlan and Zinman (2008) find that a 1 per cent increase 
in monthly interest charges reduces the loan take-up rate with an average of 8.5 per cent by an 
economically insignificant 0.3 per cent1. Similarly, a rate decrease from the maximum interest 
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charged (11.75%) to the minimum one (3.25%), only increases take-up by 2.6 per cent, or 31 
per cent of the baseline take-up rate in South Africa. When it comes to the problems of 
asymmetric information, the literature suggests that specialised MFIs address them by using 
special types of financial contracts. Two distinct features of microloan contracts enable this: 
1) joint-liability (Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Gollier, 2000) and 2) dynamic incentives (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2000; Alexander Tedeschi, 2006), with both features normally utilised simultaneously 
(Aniket, 2007; Chowdhury, 2005, 2007). More specifically, a popular approach to microcredit 
entails lending to jointly liable groups of borrowers. Typically, borrowers take turns in 
receiving microloans, and each subsequent loan is subject to successful repayment of the 
preceding one, passing on monitoring responsibility to group peers. Furthermore, dynamic 
incentives allow for a reputation accumulation effect, where each borrower can progressively 
attain higher borrowing margins contingent on successful loan settlement. 
The last rigorous academic snapshot of microfinance2 was through Morduch (1999) 
who discusses a plethora of issues including social impacts and the empowerment of women, 
and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) who focus on joint liability contracts in the context of 
cooperative borrowers. Our paper3 looks into more recent advances taking place in a dynamic 
setting contrary to early research that typically compares group to individual loans statically. 
For example, Aniket (2007) argues that unlike static group lending, the dynamic approach 
helps MFIs to separate a borrower’s effort and peer-monitoring decisions. Hence, lenders can 
incentivise one task at a time, the more expensive one, and leave less of an information rent to 
borrowers. Additionally, dynamic models have questioned ‘assortative matching’ as a 
mechanism against adverse selection in the absence of collateral, based on the ability of 
borrowers to side contract among themselves (Rai and Sjöström, 2004; Guttman, 2008).  
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The aforementioned developments and their impact especially on developing nations 
call for a current mapping of academic knowledge. Research in microfinance is diverse and 
related to issues such as bottom-up approaches to poverty alleviation, empowerment of the 
socially excluded especially in the context of gender discrimination, measuring the true 
impact of microfinance interventions, etc. A comprehensive coverage of all important issues 
is impossible in one article, so we focus on theoretical and experimental propositions relevant 
to the two distinct features of microloan contract that is joint liability and dynamic incentives, 
by discussing models that incorporate both provisions. Our study reveals a vigorously 
evolving debate that however fails at large to account for the social mission of microfinance 
in terms of contract enforcement. For example, pressure to achieve sustainability reportedly 
induces MFIs to practice anti-social or even violent enforcement methods. Some of the 
literature and results covered in this paper are also discussed in a complementary paper by 
Chowdhury (2010) in the context of the original Grameen model. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses the original group 
lending model, section III explains dynamic lending arrangements, and section IV focuses on 
recently developed models of dynamic joint liability. Section V reviews practical and 
empirical knowledge on microlending contracts, and section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. Joint Liability 
Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) discuss how joint liability contracts can mitigate asymmetric 
information by shifting some risk to borrowers. Such contracts introduce risk sharing through 
cross-accountability where failure of one member to repay affects all others. The group 
lending model works via two mechanisms: (i) assortative matching that helps resolve adverse 
selection and (ii) peer monitoring that deals with moral hazard.  
Page 4 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
5 
 
 The model is as follows: a microentrepreneur with insufficient assets faces a project 
that requires a start-up investment of 1 unit. She will only borrow to finance her project if the 
benefits of doing so exceed the costs, i.e. the payoff exceeds her reservation utility u, which 
can be viewed as her opportunity cost. The uncertain output of the microenterprise Y can take 
two values: YH with probability p and YL with probability 1-p, such that YH > YL ≥0, for 
simplicity assume YL=0 for now. Once the output is realized she has to repay gross interest ρ 
>1 to the MFI for the loan. It is assumed that the MFI aims at breaking even, the 
microentrepreneur is protected by limited liability, and that all such projects are socially 
viable with sufficient outputs to cover all social costs, i.e. MFI's cost of capital and 
microentrepreneur’s opportunity cost satisfy upY H +> ρ . Under the individual lending 
scheme the gross interest rate ρ equals the conventional rate on the loan r (i.e. ρ=r), but with 
group lending the gross interest rate also includes the cost of joint-liability c that the borrower 
incurs in the case of her peers defaulting  (i.e. ρ = r + c).  
 
Assortative Matching 
Assume risk neutral borrowers and that the probability of the financed project's success 
depends on borrower type (s: safe; r: risky), such that ps > pr. Under a single pooling contract, 
safe borrowers are forced to subsidise risky ones by paying the same rate. If borrowers are 
informed of each other’s types, potential overcrowding by risky borrowers may lead to 
adverse selection as safe borrowers will opt out due to the high rates. MFIs can avoid this 
scenario by asking borrowers to form groups of joint liability.  
Considering for simplicity groups of two, the expected utility of a type i borrower 
under joint liability with a type j partner is ))(1()( crYpprYppEU HjiHjiij −−−+−= . 
Joint liability costs of pairing with a risky borrower are higher than those of pairing with a 
safe one and everyone will want to group with the latter type (assortative matching). More 
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specifically, the net expected payoff of a risky borrower's joint liability with a safe one is EUrs 
- EUrr =pr(ps - pr)c, while the net expected cost of a safe borrower's joint liability with a risky 
one is EUss - EUrr =ps(ps - pr)c. Since c >0 and ps >pr nobody will want a risky partner. 
Ghatak (2000) shows that voluntary group formation under joint liability can produce 
assortative matching, serving as a screening tool. The optimal contract in his work is not 
unique but given by any pair (r, c) such that rs<r <rr, and cs >c>cr, so long as rs+cs ≤ YH, 
where (r, c) is the contract that satisfies the MFI's break-even constraint. Ghatak (1999) also 
shows that such group lending arrangements solve the under-investment problem in the sense 
of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) as well as overinvestment in the spirit of De Meza and Webb 
(1987). Gangopadhyay et al. (2005) further develop this model to find that the parameter 
region where joint liability contracts Pareto-dominate individual loan contracts, in terms of 
repayment and welfare, is smaller than suggested by Ghatak (2000). 
So far the assumption is that borrowers observe each other's types, but Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Gollier (2000) verify group lending dominance even when this is not possible. To 
follow their discussion let us assume that the safe borrower produces Y L >0 and the risky YH 
such that ps =1, 0 < pr < 1 and YL = pr YH. Ex ante, the MFI cannot distinguish between 
borrower types, but ex post it can observe the realization of Y by paying the verification cost 
v. The distribution of safe vs. risky borrowers is public information: the proportion of the safe 
type is q with the rest being of the risky type. Thus, under individual lending, the MFI, unable 
to distinguish between the two types of borrowers, sets the microloan interest rate at: 
r
r
pool pqq
vpq
r )1(
)1)(1(
−+
−−+
=
ρ
     (1) 
In a separating equilibrium, the MFI would charge the risky (safe) type a rate higher (lower) 
than this level4. Assume YL is sufficient to service the joint liability, i.e. YL > r. With the joint 
liability in 2-person groups the interest rate on microloans is determined as: 
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22
22
)1()1(
)1()1(
r
r
jl pqq
vpq
r
−−+
−−+
=
ρ
    (2) 
It is straightforward to show that (2)< (1). Joint liability generates lower interest rates 
eradicating credit rationing due to a "collateral effect", where borrower cross subsidisation 
acts as collateral. Thus, group lending can serve as a risk pooling mechanism even in the 
absence of complete information about borrowing types amid borrowers. Given that YL<YH, to 
shield against adverse selection, contracts must enforce higher cross-subsidisation from the 
risky type to the direction of the safe one. In other words individual interest rates ri must 
satisfy YL<2ri<YH, therefore the safe type will effectively pay less for the microloan than the 
risky type by taking on partial insurance against the default of the risky, contrary to the latter 
who take full insure against the safe types. The lender benefits from the presence of only safe 
borrowers, unlike the case for individual loans with rate rpool. 
According to Guttman (2008), credit availability and weak repayment enforcement by 
MFIs result in risky borrower overcrowding. This is due to side-payments amid borrowers 
(risky types pay-off safe types to form joint groups), hence assortative matching will not 
necessarily hold in the sense of Ghatak (2000). The effectiveness of group lending in dealing 
with adverse selection is also questioned by Ahlin and Waters (2009). Consider c≤r. It is 
straightforward to show that the safe borrower's indifference curve is steeper than the MFI's 
isoprofit line in (r,c) space and the safe borrower's utility maximization for a given level of 
MFI profit has the corner solution of c=r. The borrower's payoff is then equal to Y - pi (2 - 
pi)r, and the reservation interest rate is equal to: 
)2( ii pp
uY
r
−
−
=      (3) 
Given that 0<pr<ps<1 and that the denominator is a parabola maximised at pi=1, including 
safe borrowers is indeed the binding constraint and the MFI's offer must be subject to the safe 
type's maximization problem. Given the known share of risky borrowers, the MFI's isoprofit 
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is then given by r=ρ/ ( ))2( pp − , where ( ))2( pp −  is the population average of p(2 - p). This 
rate will satisfy all borrowers' participation constraints if it is not greater than the safe 
borrower's reservation rate (or group lending can lead to financing only risky borrowers):  
)2( sss pp
uY
r
−
−
=      (4) 
Thus group lending can efficiently solve adverse selection only for some values of Y, when 
individual lending cannot. 
 
Peer Monitoring 
Besley and Coate (1995) argue that social sanctions by group peers increase the likelihood of 
repayment. The cost of failure of one member motivates peers to monitor and punish each 
other. In an earlier paper on community-based informal financial organisations, Banerjee et al. 
(1994) show that such social sanctions curtail privately optimal behaviour that is detrimental 
to the common welfare. Similar results are obtained for ROSCAs (rotating savings and credit 
associations) in Besley et al. (1993).  
To develop a theoretical model of group lending in the context of moral hazard we 
draw from the setup in the previous section, but instead of an ex ante taxonomy of borrower 
types, the focus is on post-contractual behaviour5. Following loan attainment, a borrower can 
either exert costly effort to succeed, or she can shirk and gain private benefits. The first leads 
to an uncertain output Y with probability ph, while the latter leads to an uncertain output Y 
with probability pl, such that ph>pl. The cost of effort can be modelled either directly by 
assigning a cost function, or by introducing private benefits of shirking B that no one other 
than the microentrepreneur can enjoy. We resort to the latter.  
In the first-best case, with full information, the borrower's choice of effort can be 
deduced based on a set of observable variables. In the second-best case, with incomplete 
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information, the borrower's effort is not observable, hence the MFI has to offer an incentive-
compatible contract to induce the borrower to exert sufficient repayment effort. For 
simplicity, we normalise the borrower's reservation utility to zero. The borrower's 
participation constraint that the MFI should satisfy is then given by ph(Y-r)≥0, which implies 
that Y≥r. The MFI's own participation constraint is then phr≥ρ, based on its break-even 
condition. Hence the boundaries for the microloan rate are: 
hp
rY ρ≥≥       (5) 
In the presence of rational borrowers, this implies that only socially viable projects are 
financed. A rational borrower then exerts effort only if (Y-r) ph≥(Y-r)pl+B, which implies that: 
p
BYr
∆
−≤       (6) 
where ∆p=ph-pl. This shows that the maximum rate that can be charged is lower than with full 
information because the borrower receives information rents reflecting private benefits. In a 
group lending situation where members possess superior information compared to the MFI 
about each other, peers can perform monitoring tasks that can reduce the borrower's private 
benefits. A smaller B implies a higher upper boundary for the incentive compatible level of 
the interest rate. Under perfect monitoring, private benefits are fully eliminated, and the MFI-
microentrepreneur relationship becomes one of full information. 
Madajewicz (2004) suggests that joint liability in credit contracts can have a negative 
incentive effect that can outweigh the effort-inducing property of peer monitoring. More 
specifically, jointly liable borrowers can exhibit riskier behaviour compared to when entering 
individual microloan contracts, where each would bear the full cost of the project. To deal 
with this, MFIs can offer smaller loans under joint-liability compared to individual loans.  
Another ex post moral hazard problem of financing under asymmetric information is 
that borrowers may report failure in case of success to avoid loan repayment. Suppose that 
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peer monitoring comes at a cost m, and can reveal the true value of the output with probability 
pm. Peer monitoring will take place when the expected gains from prevented liability pm Y 
outweigh the cost of monitoring m. If misreporting is found, the guilty borrower faces a fine f. 
Then a borrower will report the true output if )( rfpYrY m +−>− , which implies that: 
f
p
p
r
m
m
−
<
1
          (7) 
The higher the value of the effective punishment from joint liability (f), the higher the interest 
rate the lender can charge without hurting borrower incentives. 
Rai and Sjöström (2004) argue that moral hazard in Grameen-style group lending can 
arise due to side contracting by borrowers. They solve for the minimisation of the punishment 
imposed in equilibrium for non-repayment, essentially seeking mutual insurance to enhance 
efficiency. A borrower who fails to yield sufficient output to repay the loan will get a very 
low payoff, unless a group peer provides help with repayments. All borrowers are better off 
ex ante if successful ones are persuaded to help the unsuccessful, and it pays the MFI to 
encourage this.  
Rai and Sjöström (2004) also show that by adding a cross-reporting component 
(message game) to contracts, harsh punishments are only needed in disequilibrium. The 
mechanism at play is similar to blackmail: an unsuccessful borrower i threatens her successful 
peer j, that she will report her to the bank if she refuses to help her, exposing (not exposing) j 
(i) to a harsh punishment by the bank. This threat, induces the successful borrower to support 
borrower i, who can then repay the loan. On the other hand, if both borrowers fail, neither can 
impose this type of threat to repay their loan, and in equilibrium no threats are made and no 
punishments are executed.  
This design is aimed at facilitating microentrepreneurial cooperation, but it is founded 
on a threat and can create unnecessary tensions among already tormented and economically 
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distressed borrowers (see section V). Perhaps, it is for this reason that Grameen bank does not 
impose such rules of punishment and cross-reporting and advocates relationships based on 
trust and help. As discussed in Chowdhury (2010), although many features of the original 
Grameen model continue under Grameen II, its joint liability provisions rule-out cross-
member loan repayments6. A recent study by Giné and Karlan (2009) supports such policies, 
showing that excessive tension among group borrowers can lead to voluntary dropout. 
Another important implication of cross-reporting is that intra-group tensions may 
encourage borrowers to hide information. Benefits of intra-borrower transparency are 
discussed in Laffont and Rey (2003), who argue that efficiency is enhanced when 
entrepreneurs share information about their post-contractual behaviour even in the presence of 
collusion7. When microentrepreneurs observe each other's efforts, group lending outperforms 
individual lending based only on realized outputs even if the shared information is noisy. 
 
III. Dynamic Incentives 
In the absence of joint liability, creating dynamic incentives seem to be the only viable means 
of lending to the poor. This method facilitates the gradual augmentation of the lenders’ 
information set and incorporating it in microloan contracts boils down to either: 
(i) Threat of termination and/or rewards for timely repayment, such as increasing the size 
of the loan are used so to alleviate moral hazard problems.  
(ii) Frequent repayment schedules that also help in addressing moral hazard by acting as 
imperfect signals on the progress of borrowers’ projects. The regularity and frequency 
of repayments rapidly update lenders’ information sets8, prompting them to punish or 
reward borrowers. 
(iii) Intensive monitoring with relationship development that allows lenders to gather 
information about the use of microloans from borrowers, albeit at a cost. 
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Dynamic lending typically entails loan distribution in small instalments subject to 
performance benchmarks or covenants, that when met they serve as imperfect signals of 
borrower quality. Instalments can thus be progressively larger, providing borrowers with 
dynamic incentives, and reducing adverse selection and moral hazard costs for lenders. A 
limitation in the extant literature is that models focus on moral hazard ignoring adverse 
selection (Sannikov, 2007).  
 
Threat of termination 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) first discuss the threat of termination, but we follow the simpler 
exposition of Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000). Suppose a borrower takes out a 
loan at time t=0, to be fully repaid at time t=1 in order to obtain another loan, that in turn must 
be repaid in the ensuing period t=2. At t=1, her project generates output y, out of which she is 
to repay interest rate r. Her incentive constraint for not defaulting is yrypyy c µµ +−<+ , 
where µ, is the one-period subjective discount factor of the borrower, and pc, is the probability 
of accessing a loan after a default. Here, the MFI operates with two variables: interest rate r, 
and probability of unconditional financing pc, which can also be interpreted as the historical 
frequency of unconditional financing. Setting the latter to zero implies exclusion from further 
financing in case of default, in which case the incentive compatible interest rate is determined 
as yr µ≤ . Other than the threat of exclusion, the MFI can leverage on progressive financing.  
To show that, we introduce a multiplier θ>1 for the rate of change of the loan size, that 
renders the borrower's incentive constraint as θµµ yrypyy c +−<+ , which has a higher 
probability of being satisfied compared to the absence of progressive instalments.  
Ghosh and Van Tassel (2006) show that failure to repay the loan in a given period can 
be recovered in ensuing ones. The rationale is that continuing to extend funds to those who 
fail, induces borrowers to exert more effort as long as successful borrowers are granted more 
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bargaining power in accessing funds. An argument for more flexibility in group lending is 
also provided in Bhole and Ogden (2009), who show that group lending arrangements can be 
superior to individual ones, even in the absence of cross-reporting or social sanctions. A 
flexible and endogenously determined delay of future loans, at different durations for 
defaulting and non-defaulting group members, increases the range of microenterprises that 
can be sustainably financed.  
Chowdhury (2007) shows that the threat of termination can be critical for assortative 
matching and can resolve adverse selection relatively cheaply in a dynamic setting. On the 
other hand, prompt repayments guarantee access to loans; hence the expected utility of 
forming safe groups can be very high under sufficiently large discount rates. We discuss this 
paper and its implications in more detail in Section IV.  
 
Regular Repayment Schedules 
Repayments in frequent instalments, introduced above as creditworthiness signals, are one of 
the features that are specific to microfinance contracts. It is also common for repayments to 
commence almost immediately after taking out microloans, at least partially related to the fact 
that they are backed up by borrower daily cash flows. These two characteristics combined 
allow MFIs earlier and enhanced screening-out of misbehaving borrowers. That is, warnings 
come progressively but on average earlier, and lenders effectively initiate remedial actions as 
their information set improves.  
One way to get such signals and to mitigate moral hazard is for the MFI to leverage on 
the superior monitoring capability of the local informal lenders as in Jain and Mansuri (2003). 
Immediate post-loan repayment schedules force assetless microentrepreneurs to borrow from 
informal lenders up to the point that their project starts generating returns. Hence, by 
designing a microloan contract with a frequent repayment schedule, MFIs indirectly outsource 
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monitoring to the superiorly informed informal lenders. This appears to be correct as such 
contracts are shown to increase the demand for informal lender’s business. It should be noted 
that Jain and Mansuri (2003) employ a two period model with a single loan, but, without loss 
of generality, their argument can be strengthened by adding a repeated lending condition i.e. 
that successful repayment of the existing loan gives access to better borrowing conditions 
strengthening borrower incentive compatibility constraints. 
Regular repayment schedules intuitively call for regular meetings with loan officers, 
reinforcing cooperation and peer monitoring. Feigenberg et al. (2009) empirically support 
this, as group members who meet weekly are found to be 30% more likely to exhibit 
increased altruism, greater trust and reciprocity to peers, compared to when meeting monthly. 
Although frequent contacts may involve costs, they give MFIs opportunities to develop more 
personalized relationships with borrowers, which as will be shown below, are important when 
transacting with opaque entrepreneurs in the absence of collateral and the presence of weak 
contract enforcement. 
 
Monitoring and Relationship Building 
Relationship building and lending (through regular meetings) and underwriting loans 
based on soft information, can effectively reduce credit default risks. Soft information is 
mostly qualitative and collected over time (Udell, 2008). Its quality can be improved "through 
multiple interactions with the borrower" (Boot, 2000), performed by microloan officers as 
they operate in the field with potential and existing borrowers, i.e. quality largely depends on 
collection techniques and subjective judgements that are not easily passed on without 
discrepancies (Petersen, 2004). This is costly and may render MFI business less attractive, or 
if the cost is passed on to micro borrowers it could result in higher borrowing costs in 
equilibrium. Nonetheless, relationship lending is perhaps the most important financing tool 
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for such opaque borrowers and is the only one based exclusively on soft information. 
Contrary to soft information, hard information such as financial ratios and third-party credit 
reports is easily quantifiable and transmittable both within and across institutions9. Lending 
on hard information can take many forms (credit scoring, financial statement analysis etc.) 
and is termed in the literature as “transactions-based lending” (Berger and Udell, 2006; 
Udell). Obviously, for the poor that are excluded from the services of the mainstream 
financial institutions, such information is usually not available.  
According to Sharpe (1990) if relationship lending allows superior knowledge, lenders 
can become monopolistic financiers in a dynamic setting. Following the recent exposition of 
Freixas and Rochet (2008), consider a 2-period economy with entrepreneurs in need of 
outside financing. At the very beginning, lenders provide capital for start-up costs of 
borrowers and commit to monitoring, which in the second period is either costless, or 
unnecessary by construction. Following the first period, the borrower can choose to repay or 
default. In default she has to switch to a competing lender for the second period financing, but 
if she repays she can choose. If the borrower switches, she signs a new contract with a new 
lender that offers conditions identical to those with the incumbent lender initially, including 
costly monitoring. Knowing that, incumbent lenders can take advantage of the ex post 
monopoly power over information about their lenders, and charge interest rates in excess of 
the borrower’s level of risk, bounded above only by the borrower’s switching costs. Thus 
lenders invest in information collection through costly monitoring in the initial period to use 
the resulting monopolistic power in the subsequent period(s), which can lead to a hold-up 
situation for the borrower.  
Contrary to this, Petersen and Rajan (1995) suggest that as the relationship develops, 
borrowers gain access to better credit conditions. Recently Berg and Schrader (2009) look at 
the effects of volcanic eruptions on defaults and interest rates of microfinance clients in 
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Ecuador. Although loans approved after eruptions have an elevated default probability, for 
microentrepreneurs with existing MFI links, relationship lending increases credit availability 
and lowers interest rates. 
 
IV. Joint Liability Contracts with Dynamic Incentives 
To discuss the implications of a dynamic lending model with joint liability we rely on the 
setup of Chowdhury (2005) with some modifications for simplicity. Consider a 2-period 
economy with a monopolistic MFI and a continuum of borrowers who are to form 2-person 
groups to become eligible for microloans. At the beginning of period 1, at time t=0, the MFI 
offers a contract consisting of two microloans, 1 unit of microloan in each period. The first 
instalment is made to a randomly chosen member of the group (borrower 1), who has to repay 
the microloan at the end of period 1, time t=1. The second instalment is given to the other 
group member (borrower 2) in period 2 subject to successful repayment of the first 
instalment. In period 1, the MFI can invest the amount of the second microloan and earn gross 
interest ρ. 
Prior to the start of the contract, both borrowers 1 and 2 decide simultaneously on 
their level of monitoring m1 and m2, that comes at costs equal to 21m /2 and 22m /2 respectively. 
For the MFI to perform the monitoring itself, it would have to spend λm²/2, with λ≥1. 
Borrower 1, after getting the microloan chooses to invest in project P¹ or P². Project P¹ can be 
taken as exerting effort to successfully repay the loan, while P² can be viewed as shirking 
(Stiglitz, 1990; Tirole, 2006). Monitoring by any party allows it to obtain information on 
which project will be chosen with probability m, thus monitoring by peers is more efficient 
than MFI monitoring. 
Investment in P² yields no tangible outcome that can be used to repay the loan, but 
produces private benefits b for borrower 1. Thus, if borrower 1 chooses to undertake P² she is 
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unable to repay the loan and borrower 2 is denied her microloan in period 2. If borrower 1 
invests in P¹, then she generates a verifiable return H, out of which the bank is repaid r, and 
the remaining H-r yields (H-r)ρ in period 2. Assume that the group cannot self-finance in 
period 2. In a simple individual lending model the MFI would solve max{mr-λm²/2} with 
respect to the level of monitoring m, which yields m∗=r/λ and individual lending is only 
feasible if 2λ<r². In period 2, the MFI lends to borrower 2 only if her group-mate has 
successfully repaid at the end of period 1. Borrower 2 then chooses whether to invest in P¹ or 
P² with payoffs similar to those of borrower 1 in the first period and has to repay the loan at 
time t=2. The sequence of events and each player's respective payoff, are given in Figure 110. 
< Insert Figure 1 About Here > 
 
 Chowdhury (2005) shows that in this setting, borrowers always monitor. With certain 
assumptions this can be deduced from Figure 1. For example, the realization of H by 
borrower 1's project P¹ is verified by the MFI at t=1. So, the MFI knows that at t=2, borrower 
1 will have (H-r)ρ, and if borrower 2 defauls, the MFI seizes (H-r)ρ at t=2 to partially recover 
the microloan. Then if initially borrower 1 does not monitor borrower 2's microloan financed 
project, borrower 2 can divert the investment and borrower 1 would have a payoff of zero. By 
monitoring, borrower 1 may force borrower 2 to invest in the appropriate project, so that the 
microloan is repaid, leading to the sequential microloan for borrower 1. Then the game is 
repeated with borrower 1 getting the loan and borrower 2 monitoring. 
Chowdhury (2005) also shows that monitoring with joint liability is higher than with 
individual contracts in a dynamic setting due to additional incentives. In the presence of 
suboptimal peer-monitoring, lender monitoring can solve the problem. Aniket (2007) 
investigates a similar problem, and shows that dynamic group lending alleviates borrower 
collusion allowing MFIs increased sustainable outreach compared to static group lending. If 
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the MFI wants to incentivise high effort and prevent collective non-performance, dynamic 
group lending can reduce information rents left to the borrowers due to the MFIs inability to 
observe the borrowers' effort choices. The borrowers, in addition to choosing their effort 
level, also choose the level of peer-monitoring. A borrower selects the value of the monitoring 
cost, cm, while the level of peer-monitoring is a deterministic function of its cost B(cm). If 
microloans are allocated sequentially, in addition to lowering rents, group lending also 
increases the range of projects that can be sustainably financed. 
A similar result is obtained by Chowdhury (2007) where in dynamic group lending 
with a significant discount factor, borrowers should not collude and collectively default. 
Dynamic group lending also serves as a partial screening mechanism here. More specifically, 
for certain discount factor levels (not too low or high), safe borrowers exert effort while risky 
ones shirk rendering safe-safe groups highly profitable. The risky-risky duets are likely to be 
denied loans after the first instalment as they usually fail due to shirking. In the absence of the 
threat of termination, default would not be costly; hence assortative lending would not take 
place. Therefore, randomly choosing the first instalment recipient leads to assortative 
matching. Safe borrowers are defined as those with social capital: a private non-tangible asset, 
such as reputation, that is not transferable to another person, and can be lost in case of default. 
The central result in Chowdhury (2007) suggests that positive assortative matching in 
voluntarily formed groups occurs if, and only if, the following holds: 
b
rHb
rHb
rHb +−
<<
−+
+−
δ      (8) 
where δ, is the publicly known discount factor. Assortative matching is obvious here. The 
upper boundary of the discount factor ensures that the safe type invest in P1 to avoid losing 
their social capital, while the risky type with no social capital invest in P2. The lower 
boundary ensures that the safe-safe groups are very profitable. In other groups, if borrower 1 
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is risky she invests in P² and defaults, hence in the second period such groups are excluded, 
and dynamic joint liability serves as a partial screening device. 
Gutmann (2008) questions the result of assortative matching in dynamic group lending 
if borrowers are able to side contract with each other. While until recently the literature has 
largely ignored this possibility, in reality, borrowers do side contract to some extent. More 
specifically if the group is denied future loans only when both members' projects fail, a risky 
borrower with a higher probability of failure may be willing to pay the safe one to form a 
group.  
An efficient solution to information problems requires that dynamic group lending 
doesn’t only resort to blocking future microloan access as a punishment for non-performance. 
Bond and Rai (2009) suggest that MFIs can increase repayment incentives by either financing 
more profitable projects or by lowering microloan interest rates. In the first case, MFIs 
improve both their balance sheet and borrowers' expectations with respect to future financing 
opportunities of successful borrowers, while in the second case, they reduce borrowers’ 
financing costs. Hence, MFIs will always use at least one of these two repayment incentives 
to address potential borrower collusion and collective default. 
 
V. Microloan Contracts in Practice 
Successful implementation of microlending contracts under group lending is conditional on a 
number of factors, a summary of which is given in Table 1.  
< Insert Table 1 About Here > 
 
For example, group members should know each other fairly well and share strong social ties. 
This constitutes "social capital" and can be used as "social collateral". However, with time, 
successful group members build up their asset base and are likely to terminate their 
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membership in order to avoid peer monitoring costs. In fact, when given the choice between 
individual or group loans, borrowers prefer the first (Madajewicz, 2004), which is the usual 
practice in Europe (Calidoni and Fedele, 2009; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000). 
Hence, even if group lending is efficient, it may have a short lifetime, because MFIs that want 
to retain successful borrowers are forced to offer supplemental individual lending schemes.  
Empirical studies suggest that group lending contracts perform better than individual 
ones in terms of outreach than in terms of repayment rates (Cull et al., 2007). Chowdhury 
(2005) shows that group lending without proper monitoring arrangements can provoke serious 
moral hazard problems. Bond and Rai (2008) argue that under intra-group power imbalances, 
lending arrangements that punish all members of the group equally in failure, are suboptimal. 
In such situations, they maintain that co-signed loans perform better. Since co-signers are 
usually more affluent than borrowers themselves and able to provide some repayment 
guarantees should the borrower fail, the borrower can take out a larger loan in the presence of 
a co-signer. Hermes and Lensink (2007) provide a synopsis of empirical findings on 
microfinance11. Ahlin (2007) finds that under the assortative group mechanism, borrowers 
tend to group homogenously by class of risk. Essentially, this encourages low diversification 
while also limiting effective liability for the lender. Consequently, the lender should intervene 
in the group formation process to avoid groupings consisting exclusively of risky borrowers. 
Giné and Karlan’s (2009) empirical analysis reveals some pitfalls of group lending 
contracts. First, joint liability can create intra-group tensions that can lead to voluntary 
dropouts as well as harm members’ social capital, which is critical for the existence of safety 
nets. Second, free-riding by bad clients can increase default rates12. Third, the cost of joint 
liability can be too much of a burden for safer borrowers, also leading to higher default rates. 
While, theoretically, safer borrowers are expected to provide insurance to their not-so-
safe peers with joint liability, Fischer’s (2009) experimental study shows that actual informal 
Page 20 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
21 
 
insurance falls sufficiently short of a full risk-sharing benchmark. This may explain semi-
formal risk-sharing mechanisms, such as the state-contingent loans and supports the 
theoretical proposition of Majadewicz (2004) on the increased risk of borrower post-
contractual choices under joint liability. Fischer’s (2009) study also confirms the free-riding 
problem potential under joint liability, and that increased risk-taking is not caused by 
cooperative insurance. He finds that existing microloan contracts do not sufficiently 
incentivise borrowers to undertake risky but high-return projects. Jacobsen (2008) provides 
empirical evidence that the poor are conservative when making investments because of 
precautionary motives. Sufficient health and death insurance could encourage them to become 
less risk averse and more ambitious in their business endeavours.  
Entrepreneurial risk taking can also be enhanced through joint liability contracts. For 
example, Giné et al. (2009) find experimentally that group lending increases risk-taking by 
pushing risk-averse borrowers to take greater risks than when borrowing individually. 
Conversely, their study of Peruvian microentrepreneurs, finds evidence of assortative 
matching under voluntary group formation that can reduce excessive risk taking by group 
members in line with a number of theories discussed here. While according to the experiment, 
joint liability improves repayment rates by providing insurance to borrowers, at the same 
time, the costs of joint liability burdens mostly the risk averse individuals. Additionally, group 
lending can lead to higher loan frequencies and monitoring and improved repayment rates as 
suggested by Cason et al. (2009). This is robust to whether loans are paid out sequentially or 
simultaneously, but dwells on the assumption that peer monitoring is less costly (more 
effective) than lender monitoring13.  
Another way to improve repayment rates is by making the payment schedules more 
flexible (Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2006). Shoji (2009) performs an empirical study of such 
contracts for Bangladesh in 2004, finding that rescheduling repayments is welfare improving 
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for the borrowers, especially for the more deprived, such as landless and females. Consistent 
with the above, Mullainathan and Karlan (2006) acknowledge that although a flexible 
payment stream may generate operational headaches, it helps increase client retention and 
outreach, which is an important pro-social component in the mission of microfinance.  
The extant literature has not given enough attention to flexibility in the context of 
microloan contract pro-sociality. For instance, although contract-theoretic models of 
microfinance have so far assumed that lenders aim at breaking even at best, there is evidence 
that pressures to achieve sustainability can hinder the social mission14 of microfinance 
inducing repayment by means of anti-social and even violent methods. Dixon et al. (2007) 
report the case of a Zambian MFI that operated such inappropriate methods damaging client 
loyalty and trust with detrimental results. In India, MFI policies have been reported to cause 
loan-defaulter suicides15, while Marr (2002) reports violent conflicts among peer borrowers 
related to loan defaults in Peru. In Bangladesh, women that default are scolded in public 
places. Group members, encouraged by MFI officers, seize the defaulter’s belongings even 
taking away her nose-ring, a symbol of marriage whose removal is associated with divorce or 
widowhood, further adding to the shame (Karim, 2008). These evidence can question the 
validity of the borrowers’ limited liability assumption prevalent in existing models.  
Further research on pro-social contract enforcement could be promising if focused on 
the recently emerged theory of motivated agents. More specifically, the MFI agency literature 
has ignored credit officer intrinsic motivations, yet it is reasonable to expect that at least some 
officers have important non-pecuniary motivations for performing their job. According to 
Besley and Ghatak (2005) agents are more productive when their “ideal” mission vision 
coincides with the principal’s mission, which in turn is affected by competition between 
organizations, as is the design of incentives. The latter point is studied in Dixit (2001) in a 
multi-product environment, with one “main” and valuable product, and by-product(s) that are 
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not necessarily valuable for the principal. Nonetheless, involvement of motivated agents can 
be suboptimal in the case of differing priors (Van den Steen, 2005). More recently, Roy and 
Chowdhury (2009) have questioned the idea of extensive involvement of motivated agents in 
microfinance. A comprehensive survey of the literature on pro-social motivation is conducted 
in Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008). 
The comparative analysis of both schemes shows that both group and individual 
lending perform better on some fronts. This can explain why MFIs appear to be shifting away 
from only group or individual lending towards mixing the two approaches (see Table 2). 
< Insert Table 2 About Here > 
VI. Conclusion 
Both profit seeking and socially oriented MFIs need lending models capable of alleviating 
asymmetric information. Innovative microfinance lending schemes have proven the feasibility 
of sustainable financing of the poor despite the absence of collateral. This paper presented a 
critical literature survey of lending models with joint liability and dynamic incentives that 
encourage unsecured loan repayment.  
Early papers focus almost exclusively on joint liability, however, sustainable group 
lending hinges on the existence of social collateral rooted in intra-communal ties. In the 
absence of collateral for individual loans, progressive lending schemes seem to be the only 
viable solution for information problems. A note of caution arises from the evidence of anti-
social contract enforcement methods practiced by MFIs under the pressure to achieve 
sustainability. Prioritising repayment rates over social impact leads to undue punishment of 
borrowers that fail to make repayments regardless of the reasons. Given the 
commercialization of contemporary microfinance, this issue is becoming ever more important 
and research must address it. Recent research trends also include so called mission drift:  
financial sustainability at the expense of social impact. The empirical evidence so far has been 
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relatively mixed. In single country studies, increased competition among MFIs exacerbates 
information asymmetries and leads to multiple lending relationships resulting in higher 
default rates (McIntosh et al., 2005; McIntosh and Wydick, 2005). However, cross-country 
analysis suggests that mission drift is not present because of increased competition and the 
resulting drive for financial results (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). A broader 
debate of financial vs. development approaches to microfinance delivery is presented in Roy 
(2010).  
Unfortunately, the difficulty in finding whether financial and social objectives are in 
conflict or whether MFIs are indeed generating the socio-economic impact expected of them 
stems largely from the lack of data16. The existing databases on MFIs suffer from selection 
biases and contain few social indicators (Bauchet and Morduch, 2009), while experimental 
studies based on randomized control trials, or RCTs, that can be free of such biases, are 
expensive (Banerjee and Duflo, 2009). Although RCTs are gaining ground in empirical 
research of the impact of microfinance interventions it should be noted that they are liable to 
internal and external validity problems as well as ethical concerns (Duflo et al., 2007; Karlan 
et al., 2009). Namely, RCT intervention itself may cause the involved borrowers to behave 
differently than they would under normal circumstances. For example, the treatment group’s 
behaviour may be altered simply because the group is grateful to receive the treatment and 
aware of being studied (Hawthorne effect). In contrast, their peers from the comparison group 
who do not receive the treatment may also behave differently if they feel offended (John 
Henry effect). Deprivation of the control group from positive benefits of the intervention also 
raises an ethical issue. Additionally, validity can also be compromised by other factors such 
as possible lobbying by potential participants to gain access to preferred treatment, self-
selection of MFIs for participation in RCTs or limitation of RCTs to pipeline approaches.  
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The growing inflow of private capital into the industry and the novelty of financing 
techniques, raise the likelihood of microfinance becoming an asset class of its own. There is 
mounting evidence that private investors may view microfinance not only as a good risk-
return opportunity, but also as a good asset for portfolio diversification (Krauss and Walter, 
2008; Cull et al., 2009). This interest is further stimulated by the present financial crisis that 
compels investors to seek new hedging and investment opportunities, as part of their quest for 
more efficient mechanisms and prudent investment strategies. At the same time, the fact that 
MFIs seek to align profitability and pro-sociality so as to attract investors and to serve the 
poor, may involve new subprime frontiers of capital accumulation which is a concern for the 
development community (Roy, 2010). 
With the crisis, competition among investors is likely to loosen, and bargaining power 
is likely to shift from MFIs to private investors. Still, in the future, microfinance should be 
able to accommodate both commercial investors and socially oriented donors. In 
industrialized countries microcredit is already offered in syndication by both commercial 
banks and socially oriented MFIs (Villa and Yusupov, 2010). Ultimately, the theory of 
microfinance will have to facilitate both sustainability and social impact. Research efforts 
toward this goal will be beneficial for both practitioners and theorists. 
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Table 1. Determinants of repayment rates under group lending 
Positive effect Negative effect 
• Written formal rules on group members 
behaviour 
• Remoteness of the location of the group 
• The degree of credit rationing of the 
borrowers 
• Self-selection of the group by members 
• Strength of the social ties1 and social 
pressure within a group 
• Knowledge of peer income streams by 
group members 
• The quality of the group leader monitoring 
and social ties in running the group 
• Correlations of cross-borrower returns 
• Trust between group members 
• Duration of the loan 
• Group size 
• Number of relatives within a group 
• Average distance between group 
members 
• Homogeneity of the group in terms of 
ethnicity, occupation, income etc. 
• Loan size 
1
 Positive correlation of social ties with repayment rates is somewhat ambiguous as there is also evidence to the 
contrary in the literature (see for example Ahlin and Townsend, 2007).  
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Table 2. MFIs by lending methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number (%) of MFIs by Lending Methodology 
 
Individual Individual/Small group Group Lending 
2005 177 (36.3%) 209 (42.9%) 101 (20.7%) 
2006 178 (36.6%) 224 (46.0%) 85 (17.5%) 
2007 164 (33.7%) 245 (50.3%) 78 (17.5%) 
Source: The Microbanking Bulletin 18, Spring 2009, available at themix.org 
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t=0                                                                                     t=1                                                      t=2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sequence of events in dynamic group lending. Note: B1 and B2 are borrowers 1 
and 2 respectively. Equality signs denote the payoff of a given player. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 1 Period 2 
MFI starts 
with 2 units of 
capital, offers 
1 to B1 and 
invests 1 in p. 
B1 and B2 
choose their 
levels of 
monitoring  
B1 chooses P1  
B1 chooses P1  
MFI=ρ 
B1=b 
B2=0 
MFI=ρ+r 
B1=H-r 
B2=0 
B2 gets 
the loan 
B2 chooses P1  
B2 chooses P2  
MFI=(ρ+r-1) ρ+r 
B1=(H-r) ρ 
B2= H-r 
MFI=(ρ+r-1) ρ 
B1=(H-r) ρ 
B2= b 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
  Nonetheless, Karlan and Zinman (2008) show that rate sensitivity increases at higher rates, e.g. the levels of 
loan take-up were up to six times greater for interest rate levels higher than the lender's standard rate. 
2
  Many issues of the microfinance industry are discussed at introductory level by Armendáriz and Morduch 
(2005), which to our knowledge is the only textbook on microfinance to date. 
3
  Hermes and Lensink (2007) provide a survey of empirical evidence. Their paper can be seen as 
complementary to our work that focuses on the underlying theoretical developments. 
4
  Given YL > ρ and the zero-profit condition, the safe types always repay, so they would be charged rs=ρ. The 
risky types allow the MFI to break even if rr = [ρ + (1-q) v] / pr. 
5
  Following Stiglitz (1980), the choice of actions or behaviour can be viewed as a choice of projects. Tirole 
(2006), section 4.6, follows this approach. 
6
  Chowdhury (2010) shows that microlending contracts à la Grameen (with features like joint liability 
lending, sequential lending, contingent renewal, etc.) can harness market efficiency in places where formal 
and conventional contracts may fail. 
7
  In Laffont and Rey (2003), while MFIs do not benefit directly from borrowers' collusion, information-
sharing among microentrepreneurs is better for repayment, even if the entrepreneurs collude. The first best 
is achievable if borrowers share information about each other's efforts and do not collude. 
8
  In the extreme case of continuous repayment, lenders receive signals about the borrower's progress at every 
moment in time. 
9
  See Petersen (2004) for a conceptual discussion of soft vs. hard information. 
10
  In Chowdhury (2005) in case of successful repayment by both borrowers the group's total payoff is shared 
by the two borrowers. One gets share αand the other gets 1-α. Our presentation corresponds to α=1/(1+ρ). 
In any case, results of Chowdhury (2005) are robust with respect to α. 
11
  Notice that our review has a different focus to that of Hermes and Lensink (2007).  
12
  Consider, for example, a group of two, where each member shirks thinking that the other one will repay. In 
this case, the chances of group default rise. 
13
   Theoretical models accept that group members do not share the same monitoring ability as in Bond and Rai 
(2008). Weaker borrowers have a higher willingness to repay, since they are threatened with tougher 
sanctions ex post. Even when both borrower types have viable investment opportunities, co-signed loans 
are preferred to group loans if the power relation within the group is sufficiently unequal. 
   
14
  Research into pro-social mission versus preference for financial sustainability of MFIs has led to new 
literature on potential mission drift. Much of this literature is empirical and does not directly relate to 
microlending contracts, therefore, covering it extensively is beyond our scope. Nonetheless, it has 
governance implications for MFIs and we discuss it briefly at the end of the paper. 
15
  See "Microsharks. Rapid expansion of Indian microcredit leads to a turf war with the government" in The 
Economist, Aug 17th 2006. 
16
  Karlan and Morduch (2009) provide an excellent survey of issues related to the socio-economic impact 
expected of microfinance. 
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